

GLOBALIZATION, TERRITORIALITY, AND INTERSTATE WAR

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ABSTRACT

This paper argues that *if* globalization results in a decline in the significance of territory, war is apt to decline among the major states and those most integrated into the world economy. The argument is derived from the territorial explanation of war, which maintains that territorial disputes are the most war prone, accounting for most of the interstate wars in the post-Napoleonic era. The explanation also maintains that neighbors that accept their existing borders are much more apt to have long periods of peace than those that have territorial claims against each other. It follows that anything that would reduce the presence of territorial disputes would reduce the probability of war. War would only be reduced and not eliminated, of course, because non-territorial disputes do go to war, but not as frequently as territorial disputes.

The paper tests aspects of this explanation, reviewing evidence that territorial disputes are indeed much more war prone than other types of disputes and presenting new evidence that 1) the major periods of peace among major states from 1816-2001 are associated with a great reduction in the number of territorial disputes on the agenda and 2) an understanding among major states about the rules of the game is associated with a reduced probability of territorial disputes (that are on the agenda) escalating to war. Militarized Interstate Dispute data from the Correlates of War project are used to test the hypotheses.

The paper concludes with a preliminary investigation of whether globalization will reduce the number of territorial disputes by seeing whether increased “openness” in the global political economy reduces the number of territorial disputes in the system and, in particular, among major states. Data on “openness” is taken from Krasner (1976) and updated to 2001. The tests show that for the 20th century when the interstate economic system is open there is a decrease in the probability of territorial disputes occurring.

In an age of globalization, there has been much speculation about the erosion of borders and the decline of the territorial state (Ruggie, 1993). Prophecies of the death of the territorial state are not new. John Herz's (1957) prediction that the inability of the nation-state to defend its citizens from nuclear attack would lead to its demise turned out to be wrong, and he subsequently changed his position (Herz, 1968). In this paper, we use theory and research on the territorial explanation of war to deduce some implications about globalization and the prospects of peace in the future. We argue that *if*, and it is a big *if*, globalization results in the decline of territorial disputes, then the future could be much more peaceful than the past. We review research to show that territorial disputes are much more war prone than non-territorial disputes. We present new research that shows that periods of peace during 1816-2001 are associated with the management of territorial disputes among major states or keeping such disputes off the political agenda. These findings imply that the extent to which globalization can either reduce the importance of territory or eliminate it as an issue altogether, a key source of conflict that results in interstate war will have been eliminated. At the same time, however, the territorial explanation of war suggests that a sense of territoriality is so deeply ingrained within human beings that globalization is unlikely to lead to the complete demise of the territorial state and that some form of territorial state will be around for some time.

The claim of this paper is straightforward: it is that most wars arise from territorial disputes and that therefore the key to peace is learning how to resolve and manage those disputes. Therefore, any factor, including globalization, that has a major impact on the presence of territorial disputes will have a significant effect on the probability of interstate war.

The first part of this paper briefly presents the territorial explanation of war and reviews the research that territorial disputes are more likely to escalate to war than expected by chance

and that they are more likely to escalate to war than other types of disputes. The second part examines periods of peace from 1816-2001 and shows that they are associated with a reduction in the probability of territorial disputes escalating to war, as well as keeping these types of disputes completely or partially off the global political agenda. This finding implies that during these peaceful periods, states learn how to handle and manage territorial disputes better than in other periods. The third section presents an exploratory empirical analysis of whether economic openness of the interstate system will lead to a reduction in the number of territorial disputes in the system. The data analyses provide evidence that periods of economic openness have reduced the probability of territorial disputes occurring in the 20th century. Thus, the research in the paper provides support for the argument that globalization may reduce the likelihood of war by showing that historically interstate peace has been associated with a reduction in the number of territorial disputes and that economic openness in the system has reduced the probability of territorial disputes, at least in the 20th century. The conclusion discusses the import of these findings for assessing the possible impact of globalization on the prospects of interstate war.

I. THE TERRITORIAL EXPLANATION OF WAR: THEORY AND RESEARCH

Empirical research has shown that since 1815, territorial disputes between nation-states have a much higher probability of escalating to war than other kinds of interstate disputes. This is consistent with the territorial explanation of war. This explanation of war maintains that although wars can arise from other issues or sources of conflict (like disputes over the type of regime in power or a difference over policy), territorial issues tend to be much more likely both to recur and to eventually escalate to war than regime or other types of disputes. This theory of war also posits that if neighboring states can resolve their borders and other territorial claims,

they can have long periods of peace even though other salient non-territorial issues might arise. If this is the case, then periods of peace between two states (i.e. a dyad or pair of states) should be associated with either fewer territorial disputes or a lower probability of their escalating to war.

The territorial explanation of war posits that territorial issues are an underlying cause of war. They are underlying in two senses--one in that they do not directly give rise to war, but rather under certain conditions set off a train of events that result in war, and two in that if neighbors can resolve their territorial issues, they can have very long periods of peace, even if other salient issues might arise. The typical war in the system can be seen as originating from a territorial disagreement between neighbors. Whether that disagreement goes to war, however, depends on how it is handled.

If this theory is correct, then it would be expected that pairs of states (dyads) that have territorial disputes would be more apt to end up in war than pairs of states that contend over non-territorial issues. A number of data-based studies have found that territorial issues that are handled through the threat or use of force are more likely to escalate to war than would be expected by chance (see Gochman and Leng, 1983; Brecher, 1993; Hensel, 1996; Huth, 1996; Senese, 1996; Ben Yehuda, 1997, 1998). The findings from the above studies are highly consistent and can be considered robust in that they are derived from two independent data bases.

One of the problems with these studies is that they compare territorial disputes with non-territorial disputes without differentiating the latter category. In recent research, Vasquez and Henehan (2001) have tried to overcome this potential problem by comparing territorial disputes with other kinds of disputes--namely disputes over whether the nature of another society's form of government or specific leadership (what are labeled regime disputes) or disputes arising from

one state opposing the foreign policy of another state (as in Britain opposing slave trading during part of the 19th century).

Vasquez and Henehan (2001) find that overall during the 1816-1992 period: 1) territorial disputes have the highest probability of going to war, 2) policy disputes are the least likely to escalate to war--indeed less likely than would be expected by chance, and 3) regime disputes also have a low probability of escalating.

In addition, they find that while territorial disputes are the most prone to war, they are not the only kinds of disputes that give rise to wars. Nevertheless, they do constitute the focus of the majority of wars. Policy disputes are the focus of about a third of the wars, and regime and other types of disputes account for the remainder. This shows that issues other than territorial disputes can give rise to war and that territorial disputes are not a necessary condition for war. On the basis of this evidence, it can be concluded that territorial disputes are the key, but not the only, factor in bringing about war among states. These studies, however, focus on involvement of states in territorial disputes without controlling for the initiation of disputes. Henehan (2001) finds that states that initiate territorial disputes have a higher probability of going to war than states that initiate policy or regime disputes.

Recent studies have added to the above findings, by showing that states that have a territorial claim against each other are more apt to have a militarized interstate dispute, but that it is not the territorial claim but the resort to the threat or use of force over territory that increases the probability of war (Senese and Vasquez 2003b).¹ Senese and Vasquez (2003a) and Vasquez (2004) show that while territorial disputes are more war prone than regime or policy disputes, if they are handled through the use of certain power politics practices in the 1816-1945 period,

¹ The tests in their article show that the previous research on territorial disputes and escalation to war cannot be explained away as a function of selection bias.

such as making outside alliances or engaging in arms races, this greater increases the probability that they will escalate to war.

II. TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND PERIODS OF PEACE

If the territorial explanation of war is correct, it would also be expected that periods of peace would be associated with learning how to handle territorial disputes in a less power politics fashion and that the end result of that would be a reduction in their probability of going to war. The theory would expect that if states did not have territorial disputes or if they did not resort to the use of power politics to get their way, then the probability of war would be lower. Only a few studies of the relationship between settling territorial disputes and the war-proneness of pairs of states have been conducted, the most notable being Kocs (1995) and Gibler (1997) (see also Kacowicz, 1994; Hensel, 2001). A test of the claim being made here would be to see if periods of peace are in fact associated either with a reduction in the frequency of territorial disputes and/or a reduction in their probability of going to war. The latter would only be an initial test because by merely examining a reduction in the probability of territorial disputes going to war, one cannot necessarily infer that this reduction is brought about by avoiding handling territorial claims through power politics, let alone learning how to manage such disputes in a different manner.

Nevertheless, such a test is useful because if periods of peace were not associated with either a reduction in the frequency of territorial disputes or in their propensity to go to war, then the territorial explanation of war and the claim of this paper would be falsified. If periods of peace saw territorial disputes as prevalent as other periods or as going to war as frequently as they do in other periods, then the increase in peace must be due to some other factor.

To test this claim, it is first necessary to identify periods of peace. This is done theoretically by employing Wallenstein's (1984) hypothesis that during periods when major states attempt to implement a set of rules of the game to guide their relations, they are less likely to be involved in wars with each other and war generally is apt to be less prevalent in the system as a whole. He labels these periods as "universalist," and they can also be taken as periods when norms are more prevalent and taken more seriously by states. Conversely, he argues that when states do not have rules to guide their relations and they rely on unilateral acts, including what is here called the practices of power politics--such as alliances and military buildups (see Wallenstein, 1984)--then war is more likely. He labels these periods as "particularist." The eight periods are: 1816-1848 (U)(Concert of Europe), 1849-1870 (P), 1871-1895 (U)(Bismarckian Order), 1896-1918 (P), 1919-1932 (U)(League of Nations), 1933-1944 (P), 1945-1962 (P), 1963-1991 (U)(Détente/End of Cold War).²

Wallenstein (1984) creates his classification by relying on historians' judgments. One of the problems with this procedure is that historians might have a tendency to see rules and norms as present during periods of peace and be less likely to see them as present during periods of war. Wallenstein (1984: 246, 256, note 4) himself insists that he took pains to make sure that he did not classify periods simply by whether war or peace was prevalent. While this is an important issue, it is somewhat irrelevant to the validity of the test we present here. For our purposes, we are interested only in identifying periods of peace, so that even if historians were inadvertently influenced by the level of peace in their perception of rules and norms, that is not important to us, since all we want to know is what the periods of peace are.³ In addition, even if a reliance on

² Wallenstein's (1984) study ends in 1976 and we have classified that period up to 1991 as universalist. We see the ending of the Cold War as the beginning of a new universalist period in 1992.

historical judgments is not the most operationally rigorous measure, it is unclear how this would affect the outcome of the test being conducted here. In other words, there is no reason to expect that either Wallensteen or historians would tend to classify periods on the basis of whether those with territorial disputes present had a lower probability of war, especially since that explanation followed his study by almost ten years.

Wallensteen tested his hypothesis by using a very early data set of serious disputes between states. Here, we will re-test and extend his analysis by using the more systematic MID (2.1) data of the Correlates of War project and its recent update to 2001 (MID3.0). The Militarized Interstate Dispute data set of the Correlates of War purports to have recorded all instances of the threat or use of force between states from 1816-2001 (Jones, Bremer, and Singer, 1996), and thereby provides a record of all territorial issues that have been handled in a coercive fashion.

We begin by classifying each year from 1816 through 2001 into Wallensteen's (1984) various universalist and particularist periods, and then we examine whether he is correct in claiming that the former are more peaceful than the latter. We code the 1992-2001 period as universalist on the assumption that the attempt to construct rules of the game among the major states that began with the end of the Cold War carries over into the current period. We next examine these periods to test our claim that when they are peaceful, there will be either fewer territorial MIDs on the agenda or they will have a lower probability of going to war than they do in particularist periods.

³ Of course, if these periods can be derived more deductively, rather than just demarking the peaceful periods from those that are not so peaceful that is better for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that even though there may be measurement problems with the independent variable these may be corrected by subsequent research.

Since it is often the case that states interact differently depending on whether they are both major states, both minor states, or they are involved in an asymmetric relationship (Major-minor), we control for the status of states in a dyadic dispute thus: Major-Major, Major-minor, or minor-minor. These classifications are taken from the Correlates of War project (see Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972:22). The following are defined as major states for the periods indicated: Austria (and later Austria-Hungary) (1816-1945), Prussia (and later Germany) (1816-1917, 1925-1945), Britain (1816-2001), Russia (1816-1916, 1922-2001), France (1816-1939, 1945-2001), Italy (1860-1945), Japan (1895-1945), United States (1898-2001), China (1950-2001). All other states are, by definition, minor states.

In analyzing the MID data, we breakup all multiparty disputes to create a set of dyadic (two party) disputes, so that each pair of disputing states constitutes one observation. This is done on the rationale that even in a big multiparty war, like the two world wars, going to war with each country involves a specific decision or reaction. Designation of whether a specific MID is focused on a territorial question or a disagreement over the regime (or the type of government) of a nation-state or a general foreign policy question is taken from the MID coding on the type of revision of the status quo being contested (see Jones, Bremer, Singer, 1996: 178 for details). A dyadic dispute is coded as escalating to war only if both sides are actually involved in a war with each other (i.e. both sides must reach level five on the MID hostility scale).

Table I presents the results. Several findings are of relevance to the claim about peace. First, it is generally true that universalist periods have a much lower overall (base) probability of war than the particularist periods. As Table I makes clear, each of the universalist periods has a base probability of .00 for major states, while the particularist periods range from .16 to .36.

Although Major-minor and minor-minor states have some war in the universalist periods, the base probabilities are all .11 or lower, but .11 or above (with one exception) in the particularist periods.

TABLE I ABOUT HERE

Second, the (conditional) probability of a territorial MID escalating to war appears to be considerably reduced in the universalist periods compared to the particularist periods. In each universalist period, with a couple of exceptions, the probability of a territorial MID escalating to war is lower than a corresponding particularist period.

What is of most interest about Table I, however, is that it controls for the status of the states involved in the dyadic dispute to see whether this will help pinpoint when and where the number of territorial disputes can account for most of the reduction in the overall probability of war in an era. It can be seen in the table that the expected theoretical effect is most evident in the relations among major states. These states have no wars between them during universalist periods, a finding that re-confirms Wallensteen's (1984) original finding with new data.

A comparison of the (conditional) probabilities of territorial disputes among major states escalating to war during universalist periods provides some insight as to why and how major states have lowered their probability of going to war. In all five of the universalist periods (1816, 1871, 1919, 1963, and 1992), the probability of major state territorial disputes' going to war was reduced to 0.00. For the League of Nations (1919) period, major states managed to avoid all territorial disputes amongst themselves. Territorial disputes in the two other periods (1816, 1871) were also infrequent (1 and 4, respectively), and in all periods they are under 12 disputes. The thrust of these findings suggests that a main reason for the lowered probability of major warfare may have something to do with keeping territorial disputes off the agenda.

Indeed, there are only 23 territorial MIDs between major states in the 111 universalist years (an average of .207 per year) compared to 61 territorial MIDs between major states in the 75 particularist years (an average of .813 per year).⁴

While keeping territorial disputes off the agenda is an important reason for the low probability of war, it is not the only reason. Learning how to manage those territorial disputes that cannot be kept off is also important.⁵ Even though there are 23 territorial disputes that occur in these 111 years, none of them escalates to war. This suggests that major states have been successful in managing the territorial disputes that they have had in universalist periods. In contrast, 25 of the 61 territorial disputes (.41) they have had in particularist periods escalate to war (not shown in table).

A related finding that can be gleaned from Table I is that while the conditional probability of territorial MIDs in universalist periods is often lower than that in particularist periods, it is not the case that the conditional probability of territorial MIDs is always lower than the overall base probability for the same universalist period. For example, for Major-minor states for 1816-1848, 1919-1932 and 1963-1991, the respective base and conditional probabilities are .11--.25, .03--.10 and .03-.11. This discrepancy, which appears several times and also holds for minor-minor states, suggests that while managing territorial MIDs is obviously playing a large role in reducing the probability of war in universalist periods, peace involving minor states seems to be associated with also managing non-territorial disputes. Rules of the game among

⁴ If one examines the percentage of territorial MIDs of the total MIDs, it is still the case that universalist periods have fewer territorial MIDs. In universalist periods, 20.9% (23/110) of the MIDs are over territory (# TerrMIDs/Total MIDs), whereas in particularist periods 38.61% (61/158) of the MIDs are over territory.

⁵ On the basis of these findings, each of these periods would make an interesting case study in terms of trying to determine how territorial issues were handled by major states and how the general rules of the game they established were related to the main territorial issues of the time.

majors must also be having an impact on reducing the probability of non-territorial disputes escalating to war.

The findings in Table I can also be used to get an idea of how well the various universalist "regimes" did in managing war among the different types of actors. The Concert of Europe period, for example, seems to do quite well in managing Major state, but not Major-minor disputes. The latter, however, may not have been the intent of the Concert. Rather it seems to be the case that the rules of the game of the Concert were aimed at permitting Major states to fight wars against minor states without having to fear that a Major state might come to the aid of the minor state. Thus, the probability of a territorial dispute between a Major and minor going to war is .25, but the base probability of majors going to war against each other is zero. This phenomenon is not limited to the Concert period; in the League and Détente periods, territorial disputes between Major and minor states have a probability of escalating to war of around .10, but the base probability for war between Majors is zero. Thus, while rules among majors help prevent war amongst themselves, they do not necessarily prevent wars among Major and minor states.

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBALIZATION AND INTERSTATE WAR

Previous analyses have provided evidence that territorial disputes are a key to war by showing that territorial disputes have a higher probability of going to war than policy or regime disputes (see Vasquez and Henahan, 2001). The major new question addressed here is whether being able to manage territorial disputes is a key to peace. The findings show that this is clearly the case with disputes between major states. When major states are at peace with each other, they are able to either keep territorial disputes off the agenda or to manage them in a way that

inhibits the likelihood that they will go to war. This is very consistent with the territorial explanation of war.

What do this theory and research tell us about the future of territorial sovereignty and interstate war in light of globalization and the prospect that it will spread to more areas? The theory and research presented here show that territory is a key to peace and war. If those who predict the decline of territorial sovereignty are correct (e.g. Ruggie, 1993), then de-territorialization of the world would remove from the political agenda one of the most violence-prone issues in history. There is some evidence at the state level that when countries become liberal trading states (as opposed to seeking self-sufficient empires), they are considerably less war prone (Rosecrance, 1986). Our analysis is consistent with this conclusion in that we find: 1) that territorial disputes are the most war prone and 2) that controlling territorial disputes is a key factor in making states, especially major states, avoid war and live at peace with each other.

In this section we do a preliminary analysis of the hypothesis that globalization may result in a decrease in the number of territorial disputes. Globalization at the turn of the 21st century has certain unique aspects that make it difficult to find similar times in the past with which to compare it. Nonetheless, if we treat globalization as an indicator of a very high degree of economic openness in the international political economy, then previous periods in the post-Napoleonic era can be measured in terms of whether the interstate economic system (of the major states) have been primarily open or closed.

As a preliminary test, we have used a measure of economic openness developed by Krasner (1976), who provides categorical data for each year going back to 1815. While categorical data has problems, for a preliminary test it is more than adequate, especially given that getting precise economic data prior to 1870 is difficult. Krasner (1976: 324) looks at whether

the system is economically open or closed based on combining three indicators, consisting of the lowering or raising of tariffs, the ratio of trade to national income, and the concentration of trade within regions, with an emphasis on the major economically powerful states in the system (US, Western European states, and Japan). He states: “A period when tariffs are falling, trade proportions are rising, and regional trading patterns are becoming less extreme will be defined as one in which the structure is becoming more open” (Krasner, 1976: 324). The dichotomous measure of closed and open economic periods (0,1) used in this analysis is based on quantifying the data Krasner (1976) presents in his article and then updating it to 2001.⁶ Table III lists the years that are identified as either closed or open. The current period, 1992-2001, is separated out because it is seen as the one most closely associated with globalization.

The adequacy of these data must be judged in terms of the purpose to which we want to put them. We want to investigate whether a decline in the number of territorial disputes on the global agenda occurs when the interstate economic system is open. Despite the limits of the Krasner (1976) measure, any biases it may have are unlikely to make it associated with the rise or decline of territorial disputes, which is the hypothesis we wish to test.

To test this hypothesis, we examine the number of territorial disputes in a given year (compared to the other types of disputes present) and whether the interstate economic system is open or closed. We then examine whether open economic periods (as a whole and for specific periods) decrease the probability of territorial militarized interstate disputes from arising. Table II presents the aggregate analysis, using logit. It can be seen that closed-open economic systems

TABLE II ABOUT HERE

⁶ These data were compiled by Thomas Doleys, and our thanks to him for sharing these data with us. Our thanks to David Lake for suggesting Krasner’s (1976) analysis.

have a statistically significant impact on the propensity of territorial MIDs to arise, with the negative sign indicating that open economic systems reduce the likelihood of territorial MIDs. The calculation of predicted probabilities (using CLARIFY software developed by Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001) shows that when the economic system is open, the probability of a territorial MID is .35, and when the economic system is closed, the probability of a territorial MID increases to .49.⁷

Table III breaks down the aggregate analysis and looks at the relationship for each of the

TABLE III ABOUT HERE

economic systems from 1816 through 2001. It can be seen that the hypothesis holds primarily for the 20th century, with the probability of a dyadic territorial MID arising being low (.40) in the 1900-1913 period when the economic system is open, then increasing (to .53) when the economic system is closed and then declining again after World War II when the economic system becomes more open (.37 and .29).

It can also be seen that the hypothesis does not hold for the post-Napoleonic 19th Century. There is not much difference between the probability of territorial disputes and whether the economic system is open or closed (.36 and .30 respectively). The second period (1879-1899), which is closed, shows no increase in the probability of territorial MIDs arising. This anomaly may be a function of the fact that this is also the period of the Bismarckian Order, and his diplomatic skill in avoiding war among major states may have also reduced the number of territorial disputes in the system.

Nevertheless, this means that the entire evidentiary basis of the hypothesis rests on the World War I, inter-war, and World War II years. In addition, it should be kept in mind that, on

⁷ These predicted probabilities are significantly different since there is no overlap in their confidence intervals at the 95% level.

the one hand, the pre-1914 period, which is a period of unusually high openness and economic interdependence [where many saw war as economically impossible], ended in World War I. On the other hand, there is little doubt that the raising of tariffs and its effect on spreading the global depression had an impact on creating the conditions for World War II, which supports the hypothesis that closed economic systems are associated with a rise of territorial disputes.

A separate examination of just the 1991-2001 period, which has seen the largest growth in globalization, is also consistent with these findings. This 11-year period does not have a single territorial MID escalating to war, although two wars do erupt. There are a number of territorial disputes, 149 out of 507, but, as mentioned earlier, these constitute only 29% of the MIDs occurring.

The findings in this section, although preliminary and exploratory, do provide evidence that when the economic system is open, there tends to be a reduced likelihood of territorial MIDs arising. These findings support the territorial explanation of war that whatever reduces the presence of territorial disputes will encourage the maintenance of peace.

If territorial issues can continue to be controlled, then the future can be like the universalist periods of the past; if they cannot, then the future will be like the war-prone particularist periods of the past. While much will change in the future, it is unlikely that the fundamental factors that bring about peace and war will change. What we can hope for the future is to enhance those factors that bring about peace and diminish those factors that bring about war. If globalization encourages the adoption of rules of the games among major states, as in past universalist periods, that can be used to manage territorial disputes, then the prospects for peace are bright. At the same time, however, the territorial explanation of war suggests that territoriality, which is responsible for giving rise to territorial issues in the first place, is not

likely to go away. If human territoriality has a biological basis that we inherit from our fellow primates, it is likely that some form of territorial organization will persist and along with it the propensity to defend territory with the use of force, if necessary. A more reliable and feasible path to peace than hoping for the demise of territorial sovereignty is to learn how to manage and control territorial issues within the existing territorial nation-state system.

Even more optimistic is the prospect that globalization will make territory less economically important to all the major states, and in effect make them trading states. In this scenario, they will have no economic need to claim the territory of other major states, and thereby territorial disputes will be kept off the global political agenda. The major beneficial impact of globalization in terms of its impact on interstate war may not be the decline of the territorial state, but making major states accept the territorial status quo amongst them, thus keeping territorial disputes off the agenda. Even if these disputes are not completely kept off the agenda, globalization may reduce their salience and encourage the adoption of rules of the game that will greatly reduce their probability of going to war.

TABLE I: PERIODS OF PEACE AND THE FREQUENCY OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTES

	Base probability of War	Conditional probability of War for territorial MIDs	Number of MIDs	Number of territorial MIDs	Percentage territorial MIDs
<u>Major-Major</u>					
Universalist					
1816-1848	.00	.00	16	1	.06
1871-1895	.00	.00	17	4	.24
1919-1932	.00	-	9	0	0
1963-1991	.00	.00	44	11	.25
1992-2001	.00	.00	24	7	.29
Particularist					
1849-1870	.30	.38	20	8	.40
1896-1918	.36	.14	36	7	.19
1933-1944	.33	.67	55	27	.49
1945-1962	.16	.06	47	19	.40
<u>Major-minor</u>					
Universalist					
1816-1848	.11	.25	57	12	.21
1871-1895	.08	.07	49	15	.31
1919-1932	.03	.10	67	20	.30
1963-1991	.03	.11	247	35	.14
1992-2001	.00	.00	130	37	.28
Particularist					
1849-1870	.42	.67	69	30	.44
1896-1918	.18	.06	170	17	.10
1933-1944	.35	.62	192	110	.57
1945-1962	.11	.29	179	56	.31
<u>minor-minor</u>					
Universalist					
1816-1848	.05	.20	20	5	.25
1871-1895	.09	.08	53	24	.45
1919-1932	.08	.14	72	42	.58
1963-1991	.05	.11	677	223	.33
1992-2001	.02	.00	353	105	.30
Particularist					
1849-1870	.21	.30	71	27	.38
1896-1918	.28	.17	78	46	.59
1933-1944	.49	.57	74	63	.85
1945-1962	.08	.11	227	154	.68

TABLE II: THE PROBABILITY OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND THE OPENNESS OF THE INTERSTATE ECONOMIC SYSTEM

A. Logit Analysis of 1816-2001 Using Dichotomous Measure of Economic System Openness

Logit estimates	Number of obs	2879
	Wald chi2(1)	38.99
	Prob > chi2	0.0000
Log likelihood = -1898.1948	Pseudo R2	0.0101

Dep. Var.		Robust				
Terr. MID Onset	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Close/Open Eco. System	-.5581949	.0893923	-6.244	0.000	-.7334006	-.3829892
_constant	-.0480573	.0775343	-0.620	0.535	-.2000217	.1039071

B. Predicted Probability of Territorial Disputes

Quantity of Interest	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Pr(Terr MID onset=0)	.6471433	.0104357	.6267203	.6667596
Pr(Terr MID onset=1)	.3528567	.0104357	.3332404	.3732797

Quantity of Interest	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Pr(Terr MID onset=0)	.5125923	.0198074	.4750526	.5531347
Pr(Terr MID onset=1)	.4874077	.0198074	.4468652	.5249474

TABLE III: THE PROBABILITY OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTES FOR SPECIFIC ECONOMIC SYSTEMS

		Probability of territorial MID	Number of MIDs	Number of territorial MIDs	
1.	1816-1878	open	.36	264	95
2.	1879-1899	closed	.30	128	38
3.	1900-1913	open	.40	107	43
4.	1914-1945	closed	.53	538	287
5.	1946-1991	open	.37	1335	494
6.	1992-2001	open	.29	507	149

N = 2879

Chi square (df = 5) = 74.201 P = 0.0000

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