

**GLOBALIZATION, TERRITORIALITY, AND CONFLICT: DEFINITIONS AND
HYPOTHESES**

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Introduction to Globalization, Territoriality, and Conflict

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The world of the early twenty-first century displays three striking patterns with uncertain causal connections. Increasing globalization, whether defined as economic integration, or more broadly, to include transborder politics and cultural exchange, appears to reduce the importance of conventional territorial boundaries created by states. Integration implies as its end point an elimination of the significance of such boundaries for flows of goods, capital, and people. At the same time, citizens' territorial attachments to their home regions and countries have shown few signs of weakening. Territory remains a powerful means for the mobilization of populations. That power lies at the heart of the third pattern: the persistence of violent conflicts fought over territorial stakes. Territorial disputes continue to be the most common source of violent conflict between states, and territory has increasingly become the most frequent reason for violent conflict within states. Territorial boundaries may be less important as a barrier to the movement of capital, people, and goods, but control of these borders and the territory that they encompass often remains a central goal for elites and citizens.

The effects of globalization on changing conceptions of territoriality and the effects of those changes in turn on conflict between and within states remain unclear. The coincidence of deepening globalization, resilient territoriality, and persistent conflict undermines one familiar claim, however: that globalization, by

rendering the territorial nation-state obsolete, will, at the same time, eliminate territorial attachments and the conflicts that they inspire. Early arguments claimed that globalization—particularly global economic integration—was eroding or “hollowing out” the role of the nation-state as governance moved to global and regional international institutions and devolved to sub-national units. In addition, private actors seemed to claim a role in governance that would substitute for, rather than complement, the role of national governments. Additional investigation has revealed a modern nation-state that is far from obsolete or absent from national governance. Rather than a universal shift in the location of governance, national governments, which have remained bounded territorial units, have adapted in order to retain the effectiveness and accountability demanded by their constituents. New forms of governance have emerged in the face of competing demands from the forces of integration and the claims of constituents.¹

Just as early portraits of globalization inevitably undermining the territorial nation-state have shifted to a more ambiguous pattern of change, the concept of territoriality itself has come under intense scrutiny during the past decade. The often unquestioned assumption that territoriality was defined by the European state system has been called into question by historical analysis and by changes taking place in the territorial regime under the impact of globalization. A monolithic view of territoriality based solely on a modern conception of sovereign

¹ Kahler and Lake 2003.

territorial space has been replaced by a more contingent and mutable formulation of unit variation.²

Finally, militarized conflict also underwent re-examination as the Cold War and its “long peace” among the great powers ended. Rather than witnessing a resumption of great power rivalry and war, which had been predicted by some, a very different pattern has emerged. War between states has continued its decades-long decline while war within states has significantly increased.³ The causes of these two trends remain in doubt, but the geographic concentration of ethnic groups, the economic and political influence of diasporic communities, and economic growth have been marked as important prospective variables. Each of these factors may in turn be affected by globalization.⁴

Controversies surrounding the changing nature of globalization, territoriality, and violent conflict have centered on their definition and their consequences. Each has inspired a rich scholarly and policy literature over the past decade. Causal links among the three have been posited, but their investigation is far from complete. The project at hand draws on interdisciplinary interest in these features of the global system in order to better define them, to explore their change over time, and to propose hypotheses regarding the relationships among them.⁵ At the core of the project is a central puzzle—the

²Kahler 2002.

³ Paul Hensel (2002) observes that the greater frequency of internal or intra-state wars is not a post-Cold War or twentieth century development: they have always been more common than the relatively rare interstate conflicts and their frequency has increased markedly since 1945 (p. 35).

⁴ See Fearon and Laitin, Lyons, and Elbadawi and Hegre in this volume.

⁵ This research project, co-directed by Barbara Walter (University of California, San Diego), is supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The researchers engaged in the project are drawn from anthropology, economics, law, political science, sociology, and geography.

persistence of territorial conflict in an era of globalization-- that points in turn to two questions. What are the effects of globalization on the contemporary territorial regime—defined as the norms, institutions, and practices associated with territorial governance—and on the territorial stakes defined by key actors? The second question follows from the first, and connects globalization, the new territoriality, and militarized conflict: how do globalization and changes in territoriality affect military conflict within and between states? The second question points to a particular interest in those effects of globalization on military conflict that can be traced to changes in territoriality. The framing of the question also allows for the possibility that globalization and consequent changes in territoriality may have different effects on interstate and intrastate conflict.

GLOBALIZATION, TERRITORIALITY, AND CONFLICT DEFINED

Globalization

Before beginning an investigation of these questions, each of these contested concepts must be defined more precisely. Perhaps the most difficult is globalization, a term laden with political freight and theoretical ambiguity. For some, globalization encompasses a host of changes in international politics that can be traced to radically reduced costs of international transportation and communications. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, for example, define globalization as an increase in globalism, which is described as “networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances.”⁶ Defined in such a way, globalization becomes so all-encompassing that its usefulness for explanation is

⁶ Keohane and Nye 2000, 2.

reduced. Given its scope, endogeneity seems to be defined into the concept, and tracing the direction of causality becomes very difficult.

For the purposes of exploring its consequences for territoriality and military conflict, globalization will be more narrowly defined as economic integration at the global level, a reduction in the barriers to economic exchange and factor mobility that creates one economic space from many.⁷ Economic globalization, which is central to most contemporary debates about globalization's reach and its consequences, is driven by both the technological changes noted above and the political choices of government. Although measured through economic indices, it is not a purely technological or economic process. Although trade-based measures are often deployed to estimate levels of globalization, a definition of economic globalization should include investment and migration as well. Contemporary economic integration is driven by capital market integration and foreign direct investment by multinational corporations as much as by the opening of markets to trade in goods and services. The cross-border migration of labor may also have important political implications. Although the contemporary era of globalization lies at the center of this investigation, it is important to take into account variation in economic globalization and its constituents over time.⁸

⁷ The logic underlying this definition of globalization follows closely Kahler and Lake 2003a.

⁸ For a comparison of pre-1914 globalization and contemporary globalization, see Kahler and Lake, 2003a.

Territoriality

In contrast to the issues of scope that surround globalization, territoriality takes on two distinct meanings: territoriality as regime and territoriality as the stakes of particular actors.

Territorial regimes. For anthropologists and geographers, who view territoriality over long historical spans and across cultural divides, territoriality embodies two dimensions: delimitation of boundaries and behavior within those boundaries. Robert Sack, for example, defines territoriality as “the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area.”⁹ Each of these dimensions has demonstrated wide variation over time and across societies.

In modern political science, sociology, and international relations, recent explorations of territoriality have also questioned the axiomatic hold that the modern state has had in defining territorial rule. This new look at unit variation has unearthed the territorial and non-territorial rivals of the modern territorial state and emphasizes the contingent nature of the eventual success and expansion of this particular territorial template.¹⁰ Hendrik Spruyt and Charles Tilly, for example, emphasize the importance of city-leagues and city-states in late medieval Europe, rivals to the territorial state that enjoyed considerable success before falling to its greater military power and institutional advantages.¹¹ Andreas Osiander has challenged the claim of a sharp Westphalian break that

⁹ Sack 1986, 19.

¹⁰ For a survey of research on unit variation, see Kahler 2002.

¹¹ Spuyt 1994; Tilly 1990.

separates the modern state system from earlier conceptions of sovereignty and territoriality.¹²

John Agnew in this volume questions the conventional view that contemporary trends, including globalization pose a unique and historically unprecedented challenge to the “classic” territorial state. He questions the assumption that sovereignty—a core attribute of the modern state—has been “invariably territorial or exercised over blocs of terrestrial space.”¹³ The coincidence of sovereignty and territoriality is unusual, not commonplace. In the contemporary era of state-defined territoriality, the claim of many juridical states to exercise actual territorial control within clearly delimited boundaries has also been challenged.¹⁴ Agnew extends and amplifies this questioning in constructing four ideal-typical sovereignty regimes that have been more or less common over time, and applies those regimes to a central policy arena: currency.

This new awareness of the fluidity of territoriality and these challenges to a timeless Westphalian order require the introduction of *territorial regime* as a means to measure changes in territoriality among political actors.¹⁵ Territorial regime narrows the broad concept of territoriality produced by Sack by reducing both the actors and the behaviors of interest. A territorial regime governs the spatial exercise of authority by political elites or governments. As defined earlier, such a regime is constituted by the norms, institutions, and practices associated

¹² Osiander 2001.

¹³ Agnew in this volume.

¹⁴ Jackson 1990.

¹⁵ Territorial regime may be seen as the territorial dimension of Agnew’s sovereignty regime.

with territorial governance. Its two principal dimensions are border delimitation and jurisdictional congruence. Border delimitation captures the means by which political units separate themselves from other units, means that can in turn be characterized by more or less precision and permanence. Jurisdictional congruence measures the degree to which exclusive political authority across policy domains coincides with those boundaries.

Territorial regimes have displayed considerable variation over time. For example, Friedrich Kratochwil contrasts border delimitation practices and jurisdictional authority among pastoral or nomadic peoples with the institutions of ancient empires and the contemporary states system.¹⁶ The introduction of fixed property among the Mongols—a different and more permanent sort of control over territory—led to a decline in their mobility, which had been a major strategic asset against the Chinese empire, and to the institution of new and more permanent hierarchical relations with their sedentary neighbors.¹⁷ Michael Saltman has described a similar transition among the Kipsigi, a formerly pastoral people in Kenya.¹⁸ The dimensions of territoriality have also differed across regions as well as among different types of units. Amitav Acharya describes the pre-colonial inter-state system in Southeast Asia as “loosely organised states existing side-by-side without clearly defined territorial limits.”¹⁹ In pre-colonial

¹⁶ Kratochwil 1986.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 30-31.

¹⁸ Saltman 2002.

¹⁹ Acharya 2000, 21. Acharya is describing the mandala system of O. W. Wolters, the galactic polity of Stanley Tambiah, and the theatre state of Clifford Geertz.

Africa, an abundance of land coupled with relatively low population meant that authority faded rapidly from the center to the ill-defined edges of the polity.²⁰

Territoriality as actor stakes. Defining territoriality as territorial regime opens to greater scrutiny the Westphalian image of precisely delimited borders and exclusive jurisdiction within those borders. For those preoccupied with the role of territorial claims in violent conflict among or within units, however, a second definition of territoriality seems more pertinent: the importance of territory as a stake in bargaining among key actors. Territoriality in this second sense has also varied over time, as governments have awarded greater or lesser value to land in their disputes.

Conflicting territorial claims may involve stakes of two types. Tangible territorial stakes include varying degrees of control over land or sea, as well as the resources and populations that are part of those spatial claims. More puzzling and difficult to explain, however, are the symbolic stakes that are often invested in territorial conflicts. In many cases, particularly in the era of the nation-state, territories that are devoid of resources or substantial, ethnically related populations become the site of violent disputes. Unraveling the sources of symbolic territorial stakes will provide an explanation for many territorial disputes.

Conflict

Conflict is the least contentious of the three systemic features at the center of this collective investigation. Nevertheless, it is important to note that widespread disputes over territorial claims need not imply either a move to

²⁰ Herbst 2000.

militarized, violent conflict or an inevitable progress toward settlement.²¹ The contrast between interstate and intrastate conflicts in their territorial dimensions-- how they are initiated, whether they are protracted, and how they are settled-- suggest close attention to each stage of dispute initiation and escalation as well as the mechanics of settlement.

GLOBALIZATION AND CHANGES IN TERRITORIALITY

A conventional view of globalization pits it against the idealized territoriality of the Westphalian state and its claims to exclusive jurisdiction within carefully delimited boundaries. In this view, globalization has produced dramatic changes in the existing territorial regime and is likely to undermine it further. In addition, strong arguments can be made that globalization will reduce the importance of territorial stakes as economic assets become more mobile and land (and natural resources) become less important elements in national wealth creation and international commerce.

A more nuanced view of the effects of globalization begins with the findings of those who have challenged the fixity of the Westphalian order. As John Agnew, Kal Raustiala, and Saskia Sassen make clear in their chapters, change has always been characteristic of the territorial regime. The challenge is to determine what portion of this change, if any, can be attributed to the effects of globalization. A comparison of the earlier era of globalization (the decades before 1914) and the contemporary period suggests that the effects of globalization on the territorial regime may be more complex than often claimed.

²¹ Huth 1996; Huth 2000, p. 93.

Finally, when territoriality is defined as territorial stakes, globalization may not uniformly reduce those stakes. Symbolic stakes, in particular, may be enhanced by globalization rather than diminished.

Pre-1914 globalization and territoriality

The pre-1914 era of globalization witnessed the normative consolidation of what is often termed the Westphalian territorial regime—two centuries after the Peace of Westphalia—as well as its incorporation into state practice. Although the middle of the nineteenth century produced experiments in federal and decentralized governance, by the latter part of the century, European policy jurisdictions were increasingly and exclusively centered on the nation-state. A diverse realm of “federative politics” in Europe had been replaced by the centralized nation-state.²² This transformation affected both dimensions of the territorial regime. On the one hand, boundaries came to be formally delimited in the contemporary sense. As Peter Sahlins describes in his history of the border region between France and Spain, the Treaty of the Pyrenees, which “inaugurated the first official boundary in the modern sense” in 1659 was only the starting point in a process of border delimitation.²³ The construction of a more precise boundary regime was only completed in the Treaties of Bayonne in 1866 and 1868. Over two centuries, both national elites and local communities contributed to the social and political demarcation of the boundary between the two societies.²⁴

²² Binkley 1941.

²³ The quotation is from Kratochwil (1986), 33.

²⁴ Sahlins 1989.

At the same time, throughout Europe and other parts of the world, jurisdictional congruence—exclusive political control across policy realms within the delimited boundaries—became the norm for the first time. This was perhaps most important in the realm of identity, which lay at the core of the nation-state. As Charles Maier describes, identity space and decision space were now closer to coincidence.²⁵ This coincidence was marked, for example, by a growing national and international aversion to dual nationality—that each individual should have one nationality and only one—a norm that was consolidated in bilateral treaties, such as the Bancroft treaties signed by the United States and in a 1930 League of Nations convention.²⁶ Mercenaries, once commonplace parts of national military forces, also began to give way during the nineteenth century to citizen armies.²⁷

In central economic policy domains, a similar process of delimitation and assertion of exclusive jurisdiction also took hold in key economic policy domains during the late nineteenth century. Territorial currencies grew in importance, after centuries in which several currencies—public and private—had typically circulated within national borders. The strengthening of exclusive territorial currencies was closely linked to the building of the national territorial state, through policing of national tender laws, extension of state control over currencies that were accepted by state offices, and the use of currencies as significant national symbols. The process was driven by technological capability, in particular the ability to produce standardized currencies, as well as the

²⁵ Maier 2000.

²⁶ Koslowski 2001, 205-207.

²⁷ Avant 2000.

reduction in transaction costs that a common currency implied.²⁸ Like other dimensions of the new territorial regime, territorial currencies only triumphed in the mid-twentieth century. Before 1914, alternative models, such as currency unions and free banking, remained potent challengers.²⁹

Somewhat paradoxically, given the claims that are often made regarding the territorial effects of globalization, these shifts toward the consolidated territorial nation-state took place during decades of growing international economic integration. That earlier era of globalization figures prominently in the contribution of Kal Raustiala to this volume.³⁰ In his examination of extraterritoriality (jurisdictional claims beyond territorial boundaries), he discovers that the era of globalization in the nineteenth century marked a movement in American constitutional jurisprudence toward strict territoriality (as defined above). This application of the territorial principle applied to American citizens and the citizens of other “civilized” states. For weaker states outside Europe during this era of imperialism, globalization meant the application of extraterritoriality, extending the jurisdictions of the state beyond its borders in order to protect its citizens and favor its firms. In some cases, the extraterritorial regime was governed by a set of unequal treaties (as in the case of China); in others, the extension of jurisdiction implied rule in a more complete sense—imperialism.³¹

²⁸ Gilbert and Helleiner 1999.

²⁹ Helleiner 2003.

³⁰ Raustiala 2003.

³¹ Binkley 1941, 165-168.

Defined as the stakes valued by actors in the system, territoriality also remained strong during the first era of economic globalization. As measured by Kalevi J. Holsti, territory declined as a percentage of issues in interstate war in the nineteenth century (1815-1914) as compared to the previous century (1715-1814), but only because other issues—ideological and national—emerged during the period. As Holsti notes, “territory continued to be the main indicator of a nation’s power, as it had been since the days of Louis XIV.”³² Using a somewhat different periodization, Hensel discovers that territory has remained a relatively constant source of militarized disputes, although the 1920-1939 period (decades of low global economic integration) witnessed the highest percentage of territorial issues in such disputes.³³ Lake and O’Mahony in this volume suggest that, as state size increased over the nineteenth century, levels of interstate conflict grew, particularly in the decades of most rapid state expansion during the nineteenth century (1850-1870).³⁴

Contemporary globalization and changes in territorial regimes

The regime of delimited borders and jurisdictional congruence that emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century spread, at least juridically, around the world after 1945. The post-1945 territorial regime incorporated elements of the earlier period and at the same time modified those constituents under the influence of decolonization. Given the military and political weakness of many of the new states, an even more rigid attachment to territorial rules, norms and practices that established clear borders and ensured

³² Holsti 1991, 151.

³³ Hensel 2002, 40.

³⁴ Lake and O’Mahony in this volume.

national government control within those borders became a central aim of political elites. Technological advance and resource claims have also driven border delimitation, a trend that culminated in the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS established maritime Exclusive Economic Zones for the first time, an extension of qualified territoriality into the oceans.

Such continued attachment to a well-defined border regime seems to undermine claims that globalization has rendered borders *less* important, at least for economic exchange. Beth Simmons, in her contribution to this volume, resolves this apparent paradox by demonstrating the opportunity costs that countries bear when their borders are disputed, even when those disputes are not militarized. These costs, measured in terms of bilateral trade foregone, may be substantial. Globalization, by increasing the prospective gains that may result from settled borders, offers incentives for a well-bordered world.³⁵ Good borders make good traders.

On the other hand, contemporary territoriality also demonstrates change in several key dimensions of territoriality that may be explained in part by globalization. Although precise border delimitation has been retained and even expanded, congruence of policy jurisdictions with the national territorial domain has eroded, in what John Ruggie terms “the unbundling of territoriality.”³⁶ This process of reducing the congruence of policy domains with territorial limits has been driven in part by globalization. The revival of interest in regional currency

³⁵ Simmons 2003.

³⁶ Ruggie 1993.

unions (with Europe's EMU as the most prominent example) or the "borrowing" of another government's policy regime (in the form of dollarization) are only two examples from economic policy. Increased cross-border migration has put pressure on the demographic boundary regime, producing a reversal in international norms against dual citizenship.³⁷ Raustiala notes a parallel development in American jurisprudence, extending the reach of both American regulatory law and, for citizens at least, the spatial scope of the Constitution.³⁸ Overall, in Maier's terms, identity space coincides less and less with decision space.

The apparent effects of globalization on the territorial regime in the contemporary era differ significantly from its effects before 1914. Three possible explanations can be advanced for this puzzle. First, as Lake and O'Mahony argue, the effects of globalization before 1914 may have been swamped by other trends—technological and institutional—that created strong incentives for an increase in state size and territorial expansion. Certainly, the persistence of a strong regime of border delimitation (whatever the economic significance of those borders) is explained in large measure by technological advances. Second, globalization itself may have changed in character. An agent-centered view of globalization's effects would emphasize the different sectoral character of foreign investment in particular. Foreign investors in the earlier era of globalization insisted on territorial control to guarantee their economic stakes; after 1945, new

³⁷ Koslowski 2001,

³⁸ Raustiala 2003.

forms of investment changed the territorial program of economic agents.³⁹ Finally, as has already been suggested, asymmetries in power remain important, but the territorial regime itself may have independent influence on the ability of more powerful states to exert territorial control despite their persistent efforts in both eras to make extraterritorial claims.

Contemporary globalization and changes in territorial stakes

Since 1945, changes in territoriality have affected the tangible stakes identified by actors in the global system. Legal norms against forceful change in interstate borders have strengthened. The territorial integrity norm, which stipulates that force should not be used to alter interstate borders, has become more prominent and effective since 1945. No important cases of territorial expansion through conquest have occurred since 1976.⁴⁰ This apparent strengthening of the norm against territorial conquest may be linked to globalization in two ways. David Lake and Angela O'Mahony argue in their chapter that increasing economic openness after 1945 created disincentives for territorial amalgamation.⁴¹ Powerful states that might have challenged the norm in earlier eras were generally willing to accept in the last decades of the twentieth century.

A second and more direct connection to a decline in the importance of territorial stakes lies in globalization's effects on economic development and the structure of the economy. To the degree that globalization spurs industrialization, the value of land as a factor of production (and incentives to

³⁹ Kahler 1984, Frieden, Lipson.

⁴⁰ Zacher 2001

⁴¹ Lake and O'Mahony 2003; Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg 1997.

conquest) will decline as well, reducing the incentives for territorial acquisition.⁴² Globalization also disperses industrial production and integrates it in far-flung networks. Territorial acquisition is therefore unlikely to produce control over significant economic sectors or technologies as a result. Stephen Brooks argues that the central role of foreign direct investment in contemporary globalization may allow governments to substitute that instrument of external economic influence for the older instrument of conquest.⁴³ Each of these economic changes is associated with contemporary globalization (but not to the same degree with pre-1914 globalization); each also reduces the incentives for territorial acquisition.

Globalization has also affected the territorial stakes of sub-national actors, but in a very different way. As Lake and O'Mahony argue in their chapter, economic openness has made it possible for smaller territorial units to prosper, creating incentives for dissatisfied groups to seek self-determination. In their chapter, Elbadawi and Hegre suggest that trade shocks created by increased openness might disproportionately benefit or hurt particular geographical regions within a country, exacerbating internal conflict. They fail to find "any strong relationship between openness, shocks, and armed conflict," however.⁴⁴ Globalization may therefore reduce territorial stakes for existing independent states, but it may have an inverse effect on minority groups within such states: making their own territorial acquisition (secession) more attractive.

⁴² Zacher 2001.

⁴³ Brooks 1999.

⁴⁴ Elbadawi and Hegre in this volume.

Symbolic territorial stakes. The effects of globalization on tangible territorial stakes may fail to parallel its influence on the symbolic stakes associated with territory. One of the puzzles associated with the persistence of interstate territorial conflict is the apparent hold that certain territories have in the absence of any tangible value. Domestic political dynamics, which may be influenced by globalization, lie at the core of such attachments. The salience of a territory for domestic political audiences may increase with its economic value or the presence of ethnically similar populations, but its significance is ultimately a political construction. Four of the chapters in this volume reflect on the hold of symbolic territorial stakes and the effects of globalization on those stakes. Hein Goemans suggests one means by which the “homeland” is defined: a set of focal principles, shared by elites and populations, that provide a medium of definition and a means of coordinating their behavior in response to common threats.⁴⁵ History and culture provide a reservoir of such focal points; certain focal points may also be reinforced by the contemporary territorial regime. A major constituent of that regime is typically a set of shared focal points for reaching agreement on legitimate boundaries. In the consolidation of territorial national states in nineteenth-century Europe, the focal point of cultural homogeneity or prior historical formation overtook older focal points, such as natural boundaries. Goemans notes that economic integration may also serve as a focal point for homeland identification. As suggested earlier, globalization may have the effect of reducing the salience of integration at the level of the

⁴⁵ Goemans 2003.

nation-state as a focal principle, creating incentives for the fragmentation of existing territorial units).

Historical analysis of territoriality also confirms that symbolic territorial attachments are not always manipulated from the top down, but are also constructed at the local level. Anssi Paasi's account of the Finnish-Soviet border in the twentieth century confirms the importance of local boundary construction identified by Sahlins in earlier centuries.⁴⁶ Joel Robbins presents a case of negative territorial attachment in his account of the Urapmin of Papua New Guinea, a group who, under the influence of cultural (religious) and economic globalization, reject their existing territorial domain in favor of wider identities. The homeland in this case is not a reservoir of positive emotional attachment, but a persistent barrier to their religious and economic aspirations. Robbins recreates at the local level a parallel to the territorial reconstitution traced by Agnew at the national and international level.⁴⁷ Two competing versions of globalization's effects on such local territorial attachments emerge: on the one hand, globalization may provoke an identity backlash that deepens symbolic territorial attachments at the local level; on the other, globalization, in this case defined more broadly than economic globalization, may provide a menu of new identities that undermine or usurp older symbolic attachments to territory, as it did in the case of the Urapmin.

David Newman also traces reterritorialization at the local level. Like other authors in the volume, he rejects a simple trajectory from globalization to a

⁴⁶ Paasi 1996.

⁴⁷ Robbins 2003.

borderless world. For many ethno-territorial conflicts, the creation of territorial facts on the (local) ground has been a central instrument in creating new landscapes and new territorial realities. The territorial expressions of such conflicts, through such processes as residential segregation and differential distribution of resources are part of the micro-level means for reshaping territory that may later be reflected at the more familiar level of national borders and conflicts. Such compartmentalization may also undermine efforts at conflict resolution at the national level.

Finally, globalization may strengthen a final set of actors with high symbolic stakes and politically significant attachments to territory: diasporas. Terrence Lyons examines those attachments and their determinants as well as the attitudes of diasporas toward territorial politics in the homeland.⁴⁸ Defined by the fact that “‘the old country’—a notion often buried deep in language, religion, custom or folklore—always has some claim on their loyalty and emotions,”⁴⁹ diasporas were not in every case created by globalization. Contemporary globalization, however, has provided both the means for retaining close contact with the former homeland and occasionally the economic incentives to do so. Diasporas may provide an important external constituency with intense preferences regarding territorial conflict, one with resources to back up their political attitudes.

⁴⁸ Lyons 2003.

⁴⁹ Cohen 1997, ix.

GLOBALIZATION, CHANGES IN TERRITORIALITY, AND CONFLICT

Territory, as Vasquez and Henahan remind us, remains a potent source of conflict between states, one that has persisted into the current era of globalization. Even when controlling for proximity, territorial stakes remain important in many militarized disputes and wars. Territorial disputes are more likely to escalate: militarized disputes over territory are much more likely to involve a militarized response by the target state and are more likely to escalate to full-scale war. Territorial conflicts—both interstate and intrastate—are more likely to be protracted and difficult to settle. The tangible stakes associated with territorial disputes (strategic location, economic value and shared ethnic groups) clearly explain some of the active territorial claims between states, but far from all.⁵⁰

Wars within states have increased in number at the same time that the number of interstate conflicts has declined. The effects of globalization on the territorial stakes of domestic actors may also have contributed to the increased incidence of intra-state conflict. For conflicts internal to states as well as those between states, the ability to mobilize political support over a territorial conflict lies in the salience that is created, often through symbolic attachments and appeals. It is such mobilization that often makes territory—an eminently divisible stake—such an intractable issue by creating effective indivisibility.⁵¹ If globalization, through shifts the territorial regime or a reduction in territorial

⁵⁰ The preceding findings regarding territorial conflict are drawn from Huth 1996, Huth, 2000, Hensel 2000, Hensel 2002, Vasquez and Henahan 2003, and Walter 2001.

⁵¹ On the divisibility of stakes and war, see Fearon 1995.

stakes, reduces the frequency of territorial disputes between states, its contribution to the probability of war would be substantial. An analysis of such effects could also reshape strategies for the resolution of such disputes.

The direct effect of globalization on violent conflict has most often been investigated through dyadic measures of economic interdependence. Most research points to a positive relationship between interdependence and peace, although skeptical voices remain.⁵² Here the principal concern is globalization's effects on territoriality—defined as the territorial regime or the salience of territorial stakes—and whether those changes in territoriality have discernable effects on territorial disputes and the militarized conflicts that may follow from them. The following hypotheses on interstate and intrastate conflict follow from the preceding analysis of globalization and territoriality.

H1: Globalization creates a tension between border delimitation and policy jurisdictions leading to more disputes between states. Whether those disputes take the form of territorial disputes and whether they result in greater military conflict is determined in part by the territorial regime.

Globalization in the nineteenth century differed in character from contemporary globalization; it also developed within a territorial regime that was strongly bifurcated between the European (and European-descended) powers and other societies outside that regime. Conflicts among the more powerful states were limited by an increasing norm of policy congruence with territorial boundaries. (The emergence of international consensus against dual nationality was one example of this norm.) In cases of jurisdictional conflict with weaker

⁵² Russett and Oneal 2001; Morrow 1999 for a skeptical view.

societies outside the European circle, policy imposition and territorial acquisition (through a variety of imperial arrangements) were accepted instruments of national policy.

Since 1945, and particularly since 1980, the clash of national policy jurisdictions has grown as globalization has led the more powerful states to extend their norms and practices to other parts of the world that are now more closely integrated with one another. Policies that used to lie well “behind the border” have been placed on the international agenda. Among economic equals that share similar values and policies, regimes of mutual recognition or policy harmonization are typically negotiated: the European Union is a principal example of this strategy for dealing with territorial limits and jurisdictional conflict. Regional and international institutions are also deployed at the global level to reduce conflict. More powerful states still attempt to exert their extraterritorial reach to change policy in other countries, however. (Efforts by the United States and the European Union to extend the jurisdiction of their environmental policy regime through trade restrictions are only one example.) These efforts are often supported by nongovernmental groups in the industrialized countries, frustrated by the process of international consensus-building and the weakness of international organizations. Because of changes in the territorial regime since 1945, particularly the strong norm against territorial aggrandizement, coercive instruments from the earlier era of globalization are denied to the more powerful states. (Recent military interventions in Kosovo and Iraq, however, suggest that

a temporary expansion of policy jurisdiction through coercive means may still occur.)

H2. Globalization reduces the importance of territory as a tangible stake in conflict between states. It may, however, reduce the importance of land and increase the importance of certain tradeable resources that are linked to territory.

H3. In the case of diasporas and other groups, globalization may reinforce symbolic stakes in territory.

To the degree that contemporary globalization encourages territorial units of smaller scale—an effect explored in this volume by David Lake and Angel O'Mahony--the incentives for territorial acquisition by states are reduced. The deconcentration of technological innovation and production through foreign direct investment and global production networks also reduces the potential economic gains from any single territorial grab. When these effects on territorial stakes are added to the broader effects of economic interdependence on military conflict, globalization appears to dampen interstate conflict.

With regard to cross-border migration, however, reduced communications and transportation costs permit diasporic communities to retain and intensify their symbolic attachments to homeland territory. Anecdotal evidence may suggest that diasporic communities resist territorial compromise more strenuously than those in the homeland. As Terrence Lyons demonstrates, however, the effects

of diasporas on homeland conflict depend on the nature of that conflict, the characteristics of the diaspora, and attitudes toward the diaspora on the part of the host country.

H4. Globalization increases the frequency and intractability of those internal conflicts with territorial stakes.

A large number of internal conflicts have territorial stakes. Existing models of violent conflict within states suggest plausible causal connections between globalization and this pattern. The insurgency model of James Fearon and David Laitin provides one such link.⁵³ Fearon and Laitin point out that the apparent surge in civil wars during the 1990s is an artifact of their protracted character: many began in earlier decades, but few have been settled. The core of their model involves a contest between an ineffectual and arbitrary central government and a rural insurgency based in inhospitable terrain and drawing on a large population. Territoriality and globalization figure in their results in two ways. First, the international territorial regime has sustained “quasi-states” with weak administrative capability. Boundary regimes are increasingly clear at the international level; within states, however, unless their internal structure is federal, few if any such territorial conventions exist. Although pre-existing administrative boundaries have provided a relatively peaceful focal point for state disintegration (most notably in the former Soviet Union), that convention is only triggered by prospective state failure. Administrative boundaries, particularly in centralized states, are rarely functional in the settlement of internal territorial

⁵³ Fearon and Laitin 2003.

conflict. For one important group of insurgencies, labeled “sons of the soil” by Fearon and Laitin, conflicts over land or natural resources are intensified by immigration to the peripheral area by a more populous (and land-hungry) dominant group, often supported by the central government. These conflicts, particularly important in Asia, also tend to be among the most protracted.⁵⁴ Perversely, a clear-cut territorial regime *between* states and the absence of such a regime *within* states may offer strong incentives for armed resistance and secession. If globalization also provides economic incentives for smaller territorial scale, the case for a violent attempt at separation may appear even more attractive.

A second link between globalization and internal conflict lies in the resources that support such insurgencies. Both the insurgency model of Fearon and Laitin and the “greed and grievance” model of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler point to tradable resources—often high-value, low-volume contraband such as diamonds, opium, or cocaine—as crucial stimulants and supports for violent internal conflict. Since these resources are found in delimited areas of the national territory, they also reinforce the territorial character of the conflict. Without access to a world market and specifically the trading networks that permit such products to reach that market, the resource base for many internal conflicts would wither. The diasporas described earlier provide another resource that globalization permits to sustain insurgent movements as well. Overall, globalization may tilt the balance of power against weak central governments and in favor of peripheral insurgencies.

⁵⁴ Fearon 2002.

As Elbadawi and Hegre argue, however, if globalization increases economic growth, it is likely to have a dampening effect on internal conflicts. They could find little evidence that the economic shocks associated with increased openness had increased the frequency of violent internal conflict.

GLOBALIZATION AND THE RESOLUTION OF TERRITORIAL CONFLICT

Globalization may also provide incentives and instruments for resolving territorial conflict. Incorporating the links between globalization and territorial conflict may force the adaptation of conventional instruments of conflict resolution. In some cases, economic integration will support efforts to settle territorial conflicts; in others, particularly internal conflicts, globalization may need to be temporarily curbed. Erik Gartzke, for example, suggests that financial globalization enhances credible communication between governments, reducing uncertainty and the risks of war.

Perhaps the most important hypothesis that emerges regarding globalization and the resolution of territorial disputes between states lies in the economic incentives for settled boundaries provided by economic integration. As Beth Simmons argues, the opportunity costs of trade and investment foregone become more apparent as economic exchange burgeons at the global level. Her findings argue for a final hypothesis:

H4: Globalization creates strong incentives for settled national boundaries leading to less conflict between states.

Governments may seek third-party dispute resolution when the perceived opportunity costs of non-settlement become too large and domestic political dynamics do not permit bilateral settlement through negotiation. Even in the post-1945 era of international economic integration, however, Simmons discovers that resource-rich territory remains difficult to cede.⁵⁵

This hypothesis points to one avenue for deploying globalization in the interests of territorial settlement between states. Multilateral or regional arbitration regimes have not been notably effective in territorial dispute resolution when compared to more ad hoc bilateral measures. However, regional trading and investment partners could impose reputational costs on parties that do not comply with arbitration decisions as well and highlight the shared economic costs of boundaries that remain in dispute.

Globalization's effects on symbolic attachments to territory may be more difficult to address. In the balance between strengthening local and diasporic territorial attachments and creating new identities that span disputed territories, globalization's effect on identities is bound to be much weaker than the policies of national states on either side. Nevertheless, to the degree that international actors can sustain such alternative definitions of territoriality, whether cross-border or regional, those competitors to localized territorial attachments may help to weaken the symbolic territorial attachments that produce protracted territorial conflict.

Two other relationships between globalization and territoriality provide much less scope for simple policy prescriptions. The previous territorial regime,

⁵⁵ Simmons 2002.

which aimed at neat policy congruence within delimited boundaries, has clearly disintegrated. The causes of this disintegration extend beyond economic globalization, but it is unlikely that the old regime, which did reduce certain conflicts, can be reconstructed. Conflict is most likely when demands for jurisdictional extension race beyond the ability of states to coordinate or harmonize their policy domains on a consensual basis. Stronger states will continue to attempt expansion of their extraterritorial reach, often at the behest of nongovernmental organizations or private firms. International pressure can be exerted to curb the more coercive manifestations of such expansion and to sustain the value of jurisdictional diversity and policy competition within secure borders.

Finally, if globalization on balance serves to dampen interstate territorial conflict and, in certain cases, sustains violent conflicts within states, a severe policy dilemma is presented. Severing ties to the world market in order to cut off the economic lifeline of violent warlords is a very blunt and economically destructive instrument. It is also one that is probably beyond the capacities of either national governments or the international community, given the porous character of boundaries and the reach of global trading and criminal networks. A differentiated approach, symbolized by recent efforts to restrict the sale of conflict diamonds, combines reputational effects, consumer discrimination, and government support in the major consuming countries. A successful approach for other, conflict-supporting illegal products, such as drugs, has yet to be designed.

Economic globalization has slowed since the late 1990s, after the onset of the Asian financial crisis, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the end of the stock market bubble in the United States, and the SARS epidemic. There is little evidence, however, that the integration of the world economy has gone into reverse. Understanding its effects on territorial disputes and violent conflict and, if possible, harnessing its power to resolve those conflicts will remain central both to our understanding of international politics and to the international policy agenda.

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